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ABSTRACT
This paper builds on the general survey of post-mortem privacy set
out in the author’s earlier work. The concept of post-mortem privacy
is further developed both at a theoretical level (underpinned by
theories of autonomy) and a doctrinal level (considering concepts
such as testamentary freedom, and the protection of personal
data). Finally, the paper looks at some current developments of
technology (tech solutions for the protection of post-mortem
privacy) and law/policy (work done by the US Uniform Law
Commission on the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act
– UFADAA). The argument is that both of these regulatory
modalities provide examples and illustrations of how post-mortem
privacy can be recognised practically, especially in the online
environment. The paper is, therefore, setting the scene further in
this under-explored area, also aiming to set the basis for the
author’s subsequent empirical research (attitudes towards post-
mortem privacy, quantitative and qualitative).
KEYWORDS
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1. Introduction
This paper further develops findings set out in the author’s earlier work, co-authored with
Edwards (Edwards and Harbinja 2013a; Harbinja 2013). The first paper on post-mortem
privacy provides a definition of the phenomenon, that is, ‘the right of a person to preserve
and control what becomes of his or her reputation, dignity, integrity, secrets or memory
after death’ (Edwards and Harbinja 2013a, 103). This notion has so far received little attention
in law, especially in the common law countries. The authors argue that the new circum-
stances of the digital world, and in particular the emergence of a new and voluminous
array of ‘digital assets’ created, hosted and shared on intermediary platforms, and often
revealing personal or sensitive personal data, require a revisiting of this stance.1 An analysis
of comparative common and civilian law institutions, focusing on personality rights, defama-
tion, moral rights and freedom of testation, confirms that there is little support for post-
mortem privacy in common law. Conversely, personality rights, in general, attract greater pro-
tection in civilian law, including their survival after death. The authors also find that primary
role taken by contract regulation may still mean that users of US-based intermediary plat-
forms, wherever they are based, are deprived of post-mortem privacy rights. Having
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established a crucial gap in the online legal privacy protection, the authors suggest that
future protection may need to come from legislation, contract or ‘code’ solutions, of which
the first emergent into the market is Google Inactive Account Manager (IAM).2
Scholarship in this field is still emerging. Post-mortem privacy is a recognised phenom-
enon in disciplines such as psychology, counselling, anthropology and other humanities
and social sciences. The notion, however, received little if any attention by legal scholarship.
Most of the scholarship discusses post-mortem privacy only briefly when analysing legal
aspects of digital assets and death in general, or in the context of data protection (Atwater
2006; Darrow and Ferrera 2006; Desai 2008; Cahn 2011; Mazzone 2012; Beyer and Cahn
2013; Hackett and Connolly 2013; Hopkins 2013; McCallig 2013, 2014; Lee 2015). The scholar-
ship mainly originates from the US, usually offers some practical solutions (both legal and
technological ones), and analyses current and emerging legislation (e.g. Conner 2010–
2011; Perrone 2012/2013; Beyer and Cahn 2013; Sherry 2013). It does not, however, concep-
tualise the notion of post-mortem privacy, nor does it offer solid support and coherent argu-
ments for a more comprehensive legal recognition of post-mortem privacy.
This paper, therefore, aims to address the gap and conceptualise the phenomenon
further. Following the earlier research conducted by the author, the focus herein is also
on the digital post-mortem privacy, that is, privacy of the deceased Internet user. The
same rationale for the choice of this focus is applicable here, that is, the circumstances
of the digital world, and the emergence of a new and voluminous variety of ‘digital
assets’ that include an unprecedented amount of personal data, merit a fresh perspective
of post-mortem privacy. In Section 2 of this paper, the concept will be developed at a
theoretical level, underpinned by theories of autonomy established in the works of
Bentham (1843), Locke (1947), Mill (1984), Kant (1991), Hegel (1967), Raz (1986) and
Rawls (1999). These theories further translate into theories of privacy as an aspect of auton-
omy, which the author adopts and uses in conceptualising post-mortem privacy. Further
support for the recognition of post-mortem privacy is sought in the concept of testamen-
tary freedom, that is, the extension of autonomy post-mortem with regards to the disposi-
tion of one’s property. In Section 3 the paper moves to a doctrinal discussion, looking at
the current, piecemeal protection of post-mortem privacy through some other legal con-
cepts (e.g. personality rights, data protection), and explores recent regulation in the US,
which impliedly recognises this phenomenon (work done by the US Uniform Law Commis-
sion (ULC) on the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act – UFADAA, as revised in
late 2015). This section also looks at current developments of technology, that is, tech sol-
utions for the protection of post-mortem privacy (e.g. Google IAM and Facebook Legacy
Contact). It could be argued that these novel technological and policy developments
demonstrate the growth of popularity of an active post-mortem privacy convention
even in US common law jurisdictions, which have traditionally been more opposed to
the concept. It is worth noting, however, that the paper does not consider jurisdiction
per se, as jurisdiction does not play a vital role in the conceptualisation of the phenom-
enon in this instance.
2. Autonomy, testamentary freedom and post-mortem privacy
There are various stakeholders relevant to the issues surrounding post-mortem privacy
online, viz. Internet users, families, service providers, friends and society. The author
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takes a normative stance and promotes the interests of the users over their family or inter-
mediaries. The reason for this is that autonomy is asserted herein as the key value driving
the development of the law in this area. Simultaneously, there is a clear drive in the market
to provide such autonomy via Google IAM or Facebook Legacy Contact. Furthermore, the
US ULC work in the area illustrates a significant policy drive towards a greater recognition
of post-mortem privacy.
The following section will first briefly look at the most significant theories of autonomy.
These theories will be subsequently discussed in relation to the conceptions of privacy,
with the main aim to restate the link between the two concepts and then relate it to
the notion of post-mortem privacy. It is argued here that autonomy should be further
extended on death, inter alia in the form of post-mortem privacy. The analogy drawn to
support this argument is that of testamentary freedom, as another concept that implies
the extension of an individual’s autonomy on death, by way of disposing of his property
through a will.
2.1. A brief conceptualisation of autonomy
Autonomy as a concept is difficult to define, and it takes various meanings and con-
ceptions, based on different philosophical, ethical, legal and other theories.3 The theories
of autonomy draw both from deist and atheist ethical stances, will and interest theories of
rights, natural law and its opposition, explaining autonomy in relation to liberty, dignity,
self-realisation, social contract, public interest and moral (Schneewind 1998). The aim of
this section is to look at the conceptions of autonomy briefly and to the extent that this
discussion can subsequently be utilised in the privacy and post-mortem privacy analysis.
Most classical thinkers explore autonomy, relating it to freedom, ethics, personhood,
dignity and other values. The focus of this paper is on personal autonomy and not on
‘moral autonomy’, as used in Kant’s work and Kantian scholarship. However, it is still
necessary to refer to Kant’s theory first, as his discussion of autonomy is one of the
most comprehensive and influential of all times (Schneewind 1998, 550–555).
Kantian autonomy is closely linked to ethics and represents the revolutionary thinking
of morality in the eighteenth century. His theory is still extremely influential and provides a
focal point for the contemporary scholars’ discussions on ethics as well (Schneewind 1998,
3–11). Kant’s morality is based on self-governance and autonomy. According to Kant,
human beings are rational, autonomous, self-governing and they legislate moral law
(Kant 2003, 31.10, 25.14). This action by their will is a pre-condition to their obedience
of the moral law. In his later work, Kant refines his theory and introduces two principles.
The first principle mandates that human beings act externally only to allow ‘the
freedom of the will of each to coexist together with the freedom of everyone in accord-
ance with a universal law’. (1991, 6.230, 56). The second principle means that we are to
‘act according to a maxim of ends which it can be a universal law for everyone to have’
and these ends are our perfection and happiness of others. This principle is also known
as Kant’s categorical imperative (1991, 6.395, 198). Kant believes that acts to which
someone has a right may be obtained by compulsion, whereas the adoption of ends
and virtue must result from free choice (1991, 6.381, 186).
Locke, like Kant, engages in contemplating morals and free will. According to him, the
will is the power or deciding on an action, and our will engages only when we think there
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is good or bad at stake (1979, II.XXI. 31–38, 250–256). Willing to him is ‘preferring an Action
to its absence’ (Locke 1979, II.XXI. 21, 244). Bentham also talks about will and autonomy in
the context of his utilitarian writing on the greatest happiness principle. According to
Bentham, we must overcome a divergence between duty and interest by our action.
This means that we will pursue morally proper goal if legislation makes it clear that it is
to our interest (1948, X.5–7, 10; VII.1.).
Certain theories of property also refer to autonomy and free will in their attempt to
justify the concept of property. Hegel, for instance, understands property as an extension
of personality and one’s free will (1967, 169–186). For him, the property is ‘the relation of
personality to the external sphere of things, understood in terms of the free will’ (Penner
1997, 173). Also, ‘A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to
exist as an idea.’ (Hegel 1967, 41). Further, free will in every stage of development is embo-
died in something, externalised, and since things have no will, there is an absolute right of
appropriation. Therefore, a person with a will has a right to appropriate and determine the
use of a thing which is considered as not having the will (Penner 1997, 174; Alexander and
Peñalver 2012, 59–61). Similarly, Radin classifies property as fungible and personal, arguing
that property is an essential vehicle for the development of personality (1982, 957). Radin
bases these arguments on the notion of the autonomous self and individual development,
that is, autonomy (Alexander and Peñalver 2012, 69).
Many contemporary legal scholars use the notion of autonomy based on the classical
concept of liberty (Safranek and Safranek 1998, 738; Bernal 2014, 30). An extremely indi-
vidualistic stance taken by John Stuart Mill (1984, 72) in his classical work On Liberty has
been followed by Raz and Rawls, who place the emphasis on an individual as an author
of his own life, including a degree of control and leading to happiness and good life
(Raz 1986, 369; Rawls and Freeman 1999, 365). For Raz, an autonomous person is one
who ‘is a (part) author of his own life’ (1986, 369) and autonomy is a ‘constituent
element of the good life’ (1986, 408).
In summary, with all the differences in their approaches and the line of arguments, a
great number of classical and contemporary western philosophers and social theorists
consider autonomy as one of the central values and basis of their ethical and social the-
ories. This paper builds on the literature and further explores the relationship between
autonomy and privacy, to justify its normative stance. The conceptions of autonomy
used to underpin the arguments of this paper are those of personal autonomy as
explained in the works of Hegel (1967), Mill (1984), Bentham (1843), Raz (1986), Rawls
(1999) and Rao (2000). The article does not draw from the ethical considerations of auton-
omy, as suggested by Kant (1991). The reason for this is that in the author’s view, focusing
on the individual autonomy is a first necessary step in identifying the initial scope of post-
mortem privacy as a phenomenon, which could be subsequently limited by the conflicting
interests of the public (e.g. free speech, historical records and archives, etc.).
2.2. Autonomy and privacy
Many Western authors consider autonomy and privacy inseparable and include autonomy
as substantiated in the section above in their conceptions and definitions of privacy. Ortiz,
for instance, argues that privacy defines ‘the scope and limits of individual autonomy’ and
links privacy to property (Ortiz 1988, 92). For him, property includes autonomy as
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dominion over things and physical sphere, whereas privacy represents dominion over
oneself (92). Similar view has been offered by Henkin (1974, 1425). This stance closely
related to Hegel’s theory and Radin’s theory or property and personhood mentioned in
the above section. There is a rich scholarship on privacy, autonomy, dignity and person-
hood that makes similar links and interrelations.4 Recent UK privacy scholarship follows
the similar line of arguments as well. Bernal, for instance, maintains that ‘privacy is a
crucial protector of autonomy’ (2014, 9). Bernal bases his approach on Raz’s and Rawl’s
conceptions of autonomy, mentioned in the previous section.
Some of the most prominent US privacy theorists, such as Nissenbaum (2010) and
Solove (2007), also discuss the relationship between privacy and autonomy, setting the
discussion in the digital environment. For Nissenbaum, privacy is an aspect of autonomy
over one’s personal and privacy which frees us from the ‘stultifying effects of scrutiny and
approbation (or disapprobation)’, contributing to an environment that supports the ‘devel-
opment and exercise of autonomy and freedom in thought and action’ (83). Nissenbaum
further asserts that privacy is essential for our ability to make effective choices and to
follow them through, which is an essential aspect of autonomy understood as explained
earlier (2010, 82–83). Eventually, therefore, privacy is about control, as much as autonomy
and property are (Bernal 2014, 35). Similarly, an even more radical privacy as negative
liberty stance is taken by Rosen (2001, 166).
Cohen, on the other hand, offers a critique of this liberal conception of the autonomous
self, noting the post-modernist critique or social constructivism and calling for a more
nuanced theoretical account of privacy ‘in a world where social shaping is everywhere
and liberty is always a matter of degree’. (2012, 7). Schwartz belongs to the group of scho-
lars who see privacy in the positive liberty manner, arguing that there should be con-
straints to day to day autonomy and privacy so that one’s capabilities can be developed
and make better long-term choices (1999, 1660–1662). This is known as a ‘constitutive
privacy’ school of thought, which recognises autonomy as the core of privacy, but also
requires external enablement and protection, because of the societal influences on the
core of the autonomous self (Allen 1999; Cohen 2000). In addition, there are scholars
who put communitarian interest, welfare and security before the individual autonomy
and privacy, putting forward the arguments such as privacy as commons (Etzioni 2000;
Posner 2008). Regan (1995), Rao (2000) and Bennett and Raab (2006) argue that privacy
promotes equality, while Solove maintains that privacy serves multiple both individual
and collective purposes, which are bound up with everyday experience.
Based on the conceptions of privacy as an aspect of autonomy, Bernal has recently pro-
posed the concept of internet privacy rights, restating their grounding in autonomy (2014).
His conception of the internet privacy rights essentially regards the concept of informational
privacy, which is arguably the most significant aspect of privacy online. This paper adopts his
conception and develops it further with regards to post-mortem privacy.
2.3. Testamentary freedom and post-mortem privacy
The conception of post-mortem privacy developed in this paper means that autonomy
should in principle transcend death, allowing individuals to control their privacy/iden-
tity/personal data post-mortem, analogous to their post-mortem control of property
through the concept of testamentary freedom.
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In comparative academic discussions on succession laws, it is common knowledge that
the freedom of testation as a concept is much more limited in the civilian systems than it is
in common law countries. The practically unlimited freedom of testation is considered
inviolable in common law,5 stemming from liberal, laissez-faire economic and social
thought revolving around liberty and autonomy, which were explored in the section
above (du Toit 2000, 360; De Waal 2007, 14). Examples of thinkers who explicitly supported
freedom of testation include Bentham, Mill, and Locke.6 Blackstone, for instance, maintains
that wills are ‘necessary for the peace of society’ and testamentary freedom is a ‘principle
of liberty’ (1829, 437–438). It has been said that testamentary freedom ‘crystallised eight-
eenth-century liberal thinking in relation to property’ and was seen as ‘a means of self-ful-
filment’ (Atherton 1988, 134). Case law has developed similar stances. For instance,
Cockburn C J observed in the 1870 case of Banks v Goodfellow: ‘The law of every civilised
people concedes to the owner of property the right of determining by his last will, either in
whole or in part, to whom the effects, which he leaves behind him shall pass.’ In civilian
countries, this principle is considerably limited by the notion of forced heirship, giving
certain family members indefeasible claims to a part of the testator’s estate. Justifications
for limiting the principle of testamentary freedom originate from ethical, philosophical and
natural law thoughts, arguing for ‘solidarity between generations’ (De Waal 2007, 15).
Looking at freedom of testation from another perspective, more individual and personal,
some authors argue that the freedom of testation is an aspect of the testator’s personality
rights. As such, it cannot be detached from an individual, delegated or transferred from
another person (Sonnekus 2007, 79). Similarly, others characterise the freedom of testation
as the manifestation of autonomy, having a considerable effect on the emancipation of the
individual (Friedman 1966, 355; De Waal 2007, 169). Therefore, if we share these views and
see freedom of testation as another personality right, it could seem somewhat odd that
countries which provide more protection for personality rights in general, restrict the
freedomof testationmore (e.g. Germany),whereas countries that, arguably, provide less pro-
tection for personality rights (e.g. the UK and US states) value and protect freedom of testa-
tionmore (Edwards and Harbinja 2013a). This could only bring us back to the economic and
market rationale in explaining the ‘unlimited freedomof testation’ in common law countries,
giving a little space for personality arguments. Along the same line, civilian countries limit
freedomof testation for similar reasons, economic and social, puttingpersonality rights argu-
ments behind.
Freedom of testation has been briefly analysed herein in order to relate this general
concept to post-mortem autonomy and post-mortem privacy. The section, however, did
not include many details about the laws surrounding the freedom of testation, as the con-
ceptual comparisons were the focus of the section. The argument proposed in this paper is
that freedom of testation should translate into the online environment, where digital
assets mainly comprise of informational and personal data content (Edwards and Harbinja
2013a, 2013b; Harbinja 2016). These assets are a counterpart of the offline assets and
wealth. Therefore, an individual should be able to exercise his autonomy online and
decide what happens to their assets and privacy on death. As Bentham puts it in his
description of ‘auto-icon’: ‘Every man is his best biographer’ (Naffine 2000).
One of the most obvious objections to extending privacy post-mortem (where it has not
already been extended, as found by Edwards and Harbinja 2013a) is that the legal life ter-
minates on death and legal personality ceases to exist.7 Legal personality, however, as
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found by Naffine, is relative and varies from a branch of law to branch of law and from legal
family to legal family. We are particularly interested in the legal personality of individuals for
the purpose of this paper (i.e. natural persons), as opposed to that of the companies and
other entities that have legal capacity. There is no clear-cut answer as to when the legal per-
sonality dies (Tur 1987, 122; Naffine 2000). Legal personality in some cases, such as the tes-
tamentary freedom, does extendondeath, even impliedly by allowing adeceased person to
control their wealth by the wishes they expressed premortem. Along these lines, Simes
observes that
though death eliminates a man from the legal congeries of rights and duties, this does not
mean that his control, as a fact, over the devolution of his property has ceased. A legal
person he may not be, but the law still permits his dead hand to control. (1955, 1)
Tur (1987, 123) is even more critical of the definition of legal personality and its ending on
death, arguing
We do not even have… any clear idea of when a legal person comes into being or when he
ceases to exist… Nor should we regard physical death as marking the termination of legal life,
if for no other reason than the existence of a legal will, through which the physically dead
person seeks to control the disposition of his property.
This argument can further be related back to Hegel’s and Radin’s personhood theories
of property. Thus, if property is an extension of an individual’s personhood and a necessary
pre-condition for its development, then this personhood transcends death same way his
property does, through a will. Moral rights provide further support for this argument. As a
personal aspect of copyright, moral rights extend on the death of a creator, perpetually
(e.g. France), as long as the economic rights last, or for a lesser period with an option of
waiving these rights (e.g. the UK and the US, Edwards and Harbinja 2013a). This evidence
again supports a proposition that aspects of personality, in this case, dignity, integrity and
autonomy, do survive death, sometimes even for an unlimited period, as in France. There-
fore, legal personality does extend beyond death and so should privacy.
3. Law, technology, and post-mortem privacy
3.1. Piecemeal protection of aspects of post-mortem privacy
As noted earlier, post-mortem privacy is a new phenomenon in legal scholarship and,
therefore, this paper will discuss it from a doctrinal point of view as well. This will
enable a holistic conceptualisation of post-mortem privacy, encompassing its theoretical
underpinnings (i.e. autonomy) and doctrinal arguments (e.g. the protection of personal
data) for its legal recognition.
It is worth noting at the outset that one of the most significant arguments against the
legal recognition of post-mortem privacy is the lack of real harm to the user, that is, the
deceased cannot be harmed or hurt (Beverley-Smith 2002, 124). The analysis in the follow-
ing sections rejects this argument and makes an analogy with the option to bequeath
one’s property. Following a similar line of arguments, the deceased should not be inter-
ested in deciding what happens to their property on death as they would not be
present to be harmed by the allocation. The interests advanced in these cases are not
only those of the family and society in the distribution of wealth as freedom of testation
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is upheld to a lesser or greater degree in most systems, even where not congruent with the
interests or desires of heirs or society. It is submitted here that users do have interests in
what happens after their death, in the digital realm this interest is greater than in the
offline world, due to the prominence and volume of personal data disclosed online, and
the importance of digital assets in creating one’s online identity (Edwards and Harbinja
2013b, 115–144). Therefore, similar notions to testamentary freedom in relation to real
world property should be developed in online environments, for digital assets and per-
sonal data therein.
Research demonstrates that the US and UK laws do not protect post-mortem privacy as
such. Protection to some aspects of the phenomenon has been awarded by different legal
institutions, such as the laws of privacy, breach of confidence, intellectual property, per-
sonality, publicity, defamation, succession, executry and trusts and data protection. This
protection is, however, more prominent and encompassing in civil law countries,
aiming to protect the values such as autonomy, dignity and reputation, especially of the
creators (121). In English and the US common law systems, the principle has traditionally
been actio personalis moritur cum persona, meaning personal causes of action die with the
person, (e.g. defamation claims, breach of confidence claims, wrongful dismissal claims,
etc., see Baker v. Bolton, 1808). This principle has been revised by legislation mainly in
many contexts for reasons of social policy.8
It is clear that post-mortem privacy is not protected as such in English law (Edwards and
Harbinja 2013a, 125). Although in principle, the same could be said for the US,9 some
traces of post-mortem privacy protection could be found in individual states’ law. Accord-
ing to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there can be no cause of action for invasion of
privacy of a decedent, except ‘appropriation of one’s name or likeness’.10 Some states do
provide for the protection of so-called ‘publicity rights’ (rights that usually protect, celeb-
rities, but sometimes all the individuals’ right to name, image, likeness, etc.) post-mortem,
up to the limit of 70 years after death.11
Protection of personal data is to be found in the rules on data protection in the EU. Do
data protection rights survive? Human rights apply only to living persons,12 and the EU
Data Protection Directive 1995 applies only to living individuals as well, protecting the per-
sonal data of ‘natural persons’ (Article 2). However, the Directive leaves discretion in
implementation to EU member states to extend this minimum protection, which is guar-
anteed.13 Some EU states have used this possibility, and their data protection laws offer
some kind of post-mortem data protection, limited in its scope and post-mortem duration
(Edwards and Harbinja 2013a, 131–132). McCallig finds that 12 states protect the decea-
sed’s personal data (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain); 4 states expressly exclude the deceased
(Cyprus, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom); 10 states refer to personal data of a
natural person (Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy (both natural and legal person),
Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) and one state provides a temporal
limit for protection of the deceased’s personal data (Estonia, 30 years on consent, McCallig
2014). The rationale behind not giving protection to the deceased’s personal data is the
lack of the ability to consent to the processing of data.14 Similarly to the arguments put
forward by Edwards and Harbinja, McCallig also argues that there is no bar in data protec-
tion of the Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights in recognising the
deceased as data subjects (2014). The UK Data Protection Act 1998 defines personal
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data as ‘data which relate to a living individual’ (Data Protection Act 1998, s (1)(e)), denying
any post-mortem rights. The new EU data protection legislation, the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation, excludes the data of deceased people from the scope of its protection, but
also provides an option for member states to recognise post-mortem privacy as well.15
Given the previous experience, it is unlikely that many of them will use this opportunity
and provide the protection.
3.2. Recent developments in the protection of post-mortem privacy in the US
US states have been pioneers in legislating in the area of the transmission of digital assets
on death and post-mortem privacy, more generally (J Lamm – ‘February 2013 List of State
Laws and Proposals Regarding Fiduciary Access to Digital Property During Incapacity or
After Death’, Digital Passing Blog 13 February 2013). These attempts have, however,
created very different and ad hoc solutions between the states, resulting in legal uncer-
tainty and jurisdiction issues. The answer to this piecemeal legislation and possible con-
flicts of law has been an attempt to harmonise the legislation within the US. In July
2012 the US ULC formed the Committee on Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets. The goal
of the Committee was to draft an act and/or amendments to ULC acts (the Uniform
Probate Code, the Uniform Trust Code, the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceed-
ings Act, and the Uniform Power of Attorney Act) that would authorise fiduciaries to
manage and distribute, copy or delete, and access digital assets. Starting from 2012, for
the purposes of Committee meetings, The Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act has
been drafted and published online on multiple occasions. (National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, 2013). The draft from July 2014 aimed to authorise fidu-
ciaries’ to access, manage, distribute, copy or delete digital assets and accounts. It
addresses four different types of fiduciaries: personal representatives of decedents’
estates, conservators for protected persons, agents acting under a power of attorney
and trustees.
The initiative aimed to improve and develop the existing statutes attempting to con-
sider the full range of digital assets.16 The Committee struggled initially to find adequate
solutions to some very important issues in the area. For instance, in the Prefatory Note for
the Drafting Committee in the February 2013 Draft, the drafters identified the most impor-
tant issues to be clarified, including the definition of digital property (Section 2) and the
type and nature of control that can be exercised by a fiduciary (Section 4). It seemed
that some of the most controversial issues were being disputed within the Committee,
such as clarifying possible conflicts between contract and executry law, and between
heirs, family and friends.
The following version of the proposal, however, provided for fiduciaries access to all
communications, including email contents and log information (unless prohibited by
the decedent’s will), even in cases where this access conflicts with the ToS (e.g. as seen
in Yahoo!’s or Microsoft’s ToS above). In these cases, the legislation adopted under the
Act would trump ToS.17 The deceased would be able to control this access by signing a
separate set of terms and conditions provided by the service providers.
Additionally, this new draft abandoned the digital property notion altogether and left
only the concept of digital assets, comprising both the content and the log information
(information about an electronic communication, the date and time a message has
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been sent, recipient email address, etc., s. 2 (7) (8)). This draft was adopted by the ULC in
July 2014, and a consensus seemed to have been achieved on its text. However, after a
further round of lobbying caused by the industry’s dissatisfaction with the draft, and
resulted in a new version of the UFADAA, adopted in December 2015 (J Lamm, ‘Revised
Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act’ (Digital Passing, 29 Sep 2015) http://
www.digitalpassing.com/2015/09/29/revised-uniform-fiduciary-access-digital-assets-act/).
This draft retains a similar definition of digital assets to that in the previous draft of the Act
(Section 2(10), 2015). The biggest difference between the two texts is in recognition of
post-mortem privacy and technological solutions analysed in this paper (Google IAM
and Facebook Legacy Contact). The Act grants priority to service providers’ terms or
service and user choices over any other provisions, including the will (Section 4).
The final draft is, therefore, quite revolutionary and supports the main arguments in this
paper and those expressed in the author’s earlier work, viz. post-mortem privacy and code-
law solution for the transmission of digital assets. It will be interesting to see whether the
Act will achieve a wider adoption and application in the individual states, or even initiate
efforts in other countries.
3.3. Code solutions for post-mortem privacy
Building upon the theoretical and doctrinal analysis in previous sections, this section will
evaluate current developments in technology, that is, tech solutions for the protection of
post-mortem privacy (e.g. Google IAM, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/
3036546?hl=en or Facebook Legacy Contact, https://www.facebook.com/help/
1568013990080948). These solutions practically recognise and promote post-mortem
privacy, giving further support to the concept.
Google has fairly recently launched a pioneering ‘code’ solution for post-mortem trans-
mission of emails and some other services. The ‘Inactive Account Manager’, introduced in
April 2013, enables users to share ‘parts of their account data or to notify someone if
they’ve been inactive for a certain period of time’ (Google, Account Help, ‘Inactive
Account Manager for trusted contacts’ https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/
3036514?hl=en). According to the procedure, the user can nominate trusted contacts to
receive data if the user has been inactive for the time chosen by him (3–18 months).
The trusted contacts are after their identity has been verified, entitled to download data
the user left them. The user can also decide only to notify these contacts of the inactivity
and to have all his data deleted. There is a link directly from the user’s account settings
(data tools section) to the IAM.
A key problem with IAM is verification of trusted contacts. Text messages are sent to
trusted contacts (mandatory), and also, the user can choose to be notified of his
timeout by email. This could prove problematic as the phone number is not an official
way of proving identity. Furthermore, people tend to change their mobile phone providers
and numbers, and some of themmay never be able to get notified, and the user’s wish will
not be honoured in these cases. This problem has been recognised by Google, too, but the
company considers the two-factor authentication suitable for the time being before better
ways of identification are employed (identify tokens, fingerprint identification, etc.).
A second problem is a transfer of content via IAM to trusted contacts, which would
provide for different beneficiaries than the offline ones. It would, perhaps, include
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friends and digital community that would not be taken into account in an offline distri-
bution of property. This further leads us to the connected problem of conflicts between
the interests of the deceased (expressed in his digital will, or traditional will), family (as
his heirs) and friends (with whom the deceased might have firmer ties online than
those with his heirs offline, as research suggests; Kasket 2013, 7). This issue becomes
more complex in different jurisdictions, where Google’s users are based in different
parts of the world. Google, however, consider themselves bound primarily by the Califor-
nian probate law in this and other similar cases (e.g. requesting the US court order in the
access procedure described earlier). This is understandable to an extent, especially as the
service had been most likely designed and developed initially by the developers and
techies (staff working on the development of technology mainly), without major input
from the legal and policy departments. These inputs probably came at a later stage and
Google is still contemplating the viability and scalability of the service. Overall, this
could be welcomed as a good development that respects autonomy and allows users
much more control over what happens to their data on death. This is especially important
as Google stores an enormous amount of user’s data, with all the services it provides
(Gmail, Youtube, Google+, Google Drive, Photos, etc.).
Facebook seem to have followed Google’s lead and IAM with their recently announced
option of ‘Legacy Contact’. From February 2015, Facebook allows their US users to desig-
nate a friend or family member to be their Facebook estate executor and manage their
account after they have died. The Legacy Contact has a limited number of options: to
write a post to display at the top of the memorialised Timeline; to respond to new
friend requests and to update the profile picture and cover photo of a deceased user.
In addition, a user ‘may give their legacy contact permission to download an archive of
the photos, posts and profile information they shared on Facebook’. The Legacy
Contact will not be able to log in into the account or see the private messages of the
deceased. All the other settings will remain the same as before memorialisation of the
account. Finally, an option is that a user decides that their account is permanently
deleted after their death. The rationale behind this feature, according to Facebook, is to
support both the grieving individuals (it is not clear whether family, friends or all of
them) and the users who want to take more control over what happens to their
account on death (Facebook ‘Adding a Legacy Contact’ Newsroom, 12 February 2015.
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/02/adding-a-legacy-contact/).
This move from Facebook is, admittedly, a welcome development for users. It does shift
the balance of interests from family and next of kin to users. Users now have control over
who their Legacy Contact is, and this can only be one of their Facebook friends. The Legacy
Contact does not take too much control over the deceased’s account, as they cannot post
on behalf of the user (apart from the one message in remembrance and changing the
timeline and profile picture) and they need permission to download an archive of the
deceased user’s content. It is, however, unclear whether this permission includes all the
content or some categories. Also, one of the issues is the obscure place of this option
(as seen with other options in relation to the deceased’s account, see discussion above).
To designate a Facebook Legacy Contact, a user needs to go into ‘Settings’, choose ‘Secur-
ity’, and then choose ‘Legacy Contact’ at the bottom of the page. More importantly, it is
unclear whether this option will trump the options heirs and next of kin have according
to the existing policy (deactivation and memorialisation as set out above). Facebook
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need to make this clear in their terms of service. Also, there might be issues with conflict-
ing interests of heirs/families with a friend designated as a legacy contact and having the
option to download the archive of the deceased’s content. For instance, if the heirs inherit
copyright in the user’s works, and the Legacy Contact has acquired this content with the
permission of the user, will this content be exempt from the provisions of the will/intestacy
laws. With this option, Facebook shifts the balance and accounts more for the deceased’s
interests and decisions made before death. However, the balance remains unclear, and all
this needs to be clarified before Facebook moves to introduce this option to the rest of
their user base. Otherwise, a welcome move might end up in a series of legal issues
and disputes (Facebook ‘Adding a Legacy Contact’ Newsroom, 12 February 2015 http://
newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/02/adding-a-legacy-contact/).
In summary, both the services analysed above provide for a post-mortem privacy
friendly options for users’ control of their digital content and personal data. This is in
line with Bernal’s conception of internet privacy rights and the individual’s right to
request deletion of their personal data, extended post-mortem as suggested in this
paper. The novel technological developments demonstrate the emergence of an active
post-mortem privacy convention even in US common law jurisdictions, which have tra-
ditionally been more opposed to the concept of post-mortem privacy.
4. Conclusion
The paper discusses theoretical, doctrinal and technological arguments for the recognition
of post-mortem privacy in law and policy. The analysis reviewed the role of autonomy as a
value and then discussed how it supports privacy. The author follows the pro-autonomy
stance of Nissenbaum (2010) and Bernal’s (2014) as justification for the difficult choices
herein in favour of users rights, rather than platforms or families.
It is clear the law typically recognises a person’s autonomy and as a connected
phenomenon, that person’s right and ability to dispose of his or her wealth and property.
This, however, has arguably not been translated to the online world. As shown in some of
the author’s earlier works, a user’s rights of ownership over digital assets, nor their rights to
allocate these assets after death, are routinely recognised (Edwards and Harbinja 2013b;
Harbinja 2016). It can be argued that in the online world, digital assets and identities
are more closely related to privacy interests than in the offline world, and thus are
much more closely related to the personal and autonomy interests of the user. It is there-
fore argued here that separate from the general consideration of property status and, thus
transmissibility; testamentary freedom should in principle extend to digital assets created
in the online world.
The author argues for recognition of at least some degree of post-mortem privacy and
the right of an individual to dispose of/control their personal data post-mortem. Evidently,
like all user interests, post-mortem privacy rights needs to be balanced with other con-
siderations, including the same privacy interests of others and the social and personal
interests in free speech and security, etc. It is, unfortunately, not possible in the scope
of this paper to analyse the potential exceptions more in detail. The aim of the paper is
mere to discuss doctrinal and theoretical grounds for recognising post-mortem privacy.
In addition, the paper uses examples from the recent technological and legal develop-
ments that do recognise post-mortem privacy implicitly, without using the term as
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such. In discussing this difficult and grey question, this paper will take the view that auton-
omy interests play a vital part, and furthermore, that a framework for recognition of post-
mortem privacy, which will assist in the transmission of digital assets on death, is vital. The
position set out in this paper is, however, principled and the practical solution will be dis-
cussed more in the future work. The counterbalancing of such autonomy and property
interests by countervailing interests is a further issue which will be dealt with in the
author’s future work.
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Notes
1. The definition of digital assets used herein is: ‘widely and not exclusively to include a range of
intangible information goods associated with the online or digital world, including: social
network profiles (on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+ or LinkedIn); e-mails,
tweets, databases, etc.; in-game virtual assets (e.g. items bought, found or built in worlds
such as Second Life, World of Warcraft, Lineage.); digitised text, image, music or sound (e.g.
video, film and e-book files); passwords to various accounts associated with the provision
of digital goods and services, either as buyer, user or trader (e.g. to eBay, Amazon, Facebook,
YouTube.); domain names; two- or three-dimensional personality-related images or icons
(such as user icons on LiveJournal or avatars in Second Life); and the myriad of digital
assets emerging as commodities capable of being assigned worth (e.g. ‘zero day exploits’
or bugs in software which antagonists can exploit).’ See Edwards and Harbinja (2013b, 104–
105).
2. Term ‘code’ is used here as introduced in Lessig’s seminal work on the Internet regulation,
meaning Internet architecture, technology, software, or in this case services aimed to
enable an in-service control of post-mortem privacy and digital assets. See Lessig (2006).
3. See e.g. Fallon (1994, 876) ‘Autonomy … is a protean concept, which means different things
to different people.’; or Rao (2000, 369) ‘Autonomy itself is a complicated concept that incor-
porates multiple meanings.’
4. See Rappaport (2001, 443); Feinberg (1983, 483) asserts that the US Supreme Court ‘in recent
years appears to have discovered a basic constitutional right suggestive of our “sovereign per-
sonal right of self-determination,” and has given it the highly misleading name of “the right to
privacy”’; Smith (1982, 175) states that autonomy is a ‘pivotal constitutional value’ in the US
privacy cases and in other contexts; Henkin (1974, 1425); Nichol (1985, links privacy to ideal
of self-govemance.
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5. As Atherton and Vines (1996, 34) observe: ‘The ability of the testator to leave his or her prop-
erty by will to whomever pleased him or her (the testator’s testamentary freedom) was the
dominant doctrine in the common law world for about 200 years before the twentieth
century. The emphasis on the right to do what one liked with one’s property reflected the suc-
cession theory of the time-the importance of the individual, the emphasis on free will, the
importance of contract and the rise of capitalism’.
6. Locke regarded the power of bequest as part of paternal authority (1947, 156). Mill had utili-
tarian reservations about inherited wealth, but he maintained nevertheless that ‘each person
should have power to dispose by will of his or her whole property’ (1878, 281). In his Principles
of the Civil Code, Bentham thus asserted that: ‘The power of making a will…may… be con-
sidered as an instrument of authority, confided to individuals, for the encouragement of virtue
and the repression of vice in the bosom of families.… ’ (1843, 337).
7. Naffine (2000) states that ‘English law proceeds upon the basis that the deceased as a legal
person does not survive his physical death’. Or Paton’s Jurisprudence cited as authority for
the proposition that ‘most modem legal systems lay down the rule that, in cases where
legal personality is granted to human beings, personality begins at birth and ends with
death.’ (Wood and Certoma 1990, 309). But also ‘In the Anglo-American system of law, the
dead have neither rights nor duties…We may appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the
expectant interests of the unborn. There is no guardian ad litem for the deceased because
he has no interest.’ (Simes 1955, 1).
8. The principle has been revised in the United Kingdom and now only pertains to causes of
action for defamation and certain claims for bereavement. See generally Law Reform (Miscel-
laneous Provisions) Act 1934, c. 41, The Race Relations Act 1976, c. 74, Sex Discrimination Act
1975, c. 65, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, c. 50, and Administration of Justice Act 1982,
c. 53.
9. In the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the American Legal Institute takes a stance similar to
English law that a person’s privacy interest ends upon his death. Fasching v Kallinger 510
A.2d 694, 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (‘The general rule is: the right of privacy dies
with the individual. The right of privacy is a personal right and cannot, as a general rule, be
asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy is invaded.’); ‘the purely personal
right of privacy dies with the person’ Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 680 (Ct.
App. 1986); see also Hendrickson v. Cal. Newspapers, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (Ct.
App. 1975) (‘lt is well settled that the right of privacy is purely a personal one; it cannot be
asserted by anyone other than the person whose privacy has been invaded, that is, plaintiff
must plead and prove that his privacy has been invaded. Further, the right does not survive
but dies with the person.’).
10. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652I (1977) (‘Except for the appropriation of one’s name
or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual
whose privacy is invaded.’).
11. For a survey of which states provide for the protection by common and statute law, see
Edwards and Harbinja (2013a, 124); Also, for an interesting proposal of creating publicity
rights in Scots law, which would extend on death but only if registered pre-mortem for the
benefit of the beneficiaries according to the deceased’s will, see Black (2009, 226–238).
12. Jäggi v. Switzerland, App. No. 58757/00, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2006); Estate of Kresten Filtenborg
Mortensen v. Denmark, App. No. 1338/03, 2006-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006); Koch v. Germany, App. No.
497/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
13. see Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971, I-13027 (Euro-
pean Court of Justice decision deferring to the national court’s resolution of the issue) (‘On
the other hand, nothing prevents a Member State from extending the scope of the national
legislation implementing the provisions of Directive 95/46 to areas not included within the
scope thereof, provided that no other provision of Community law precludes it.’).
14. ‘Dead persons cannot give consent to use or changes in their personal data or contribute to
any balancing of interests which may be required. Rights as data subjects should in general
extend only to living individuals, but should be exercisable for a limited period after the
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death of the data subject by personal representatives.’ House of Lords Select Committee on
the European Communities, Report of the Protection of Personal Data 1992.
15. Recital 27, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016.
16. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafting Committee on Fidu-
ciary Access to Digital Assets, ‘Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act’, February 15–16, 2013,
Section 4 of the Draft reads ‘Except as a testator otherwise provided by will or until a court
otherwise orders, a personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested
persons, may exercise control over the decedent’s digital property to the extent permitted
under applicable law and a terms-of-service agreement.’ This provision clearly favours
terms of service agreements and lacks clarity for personal representatives.
17. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafting Committee on Fidu-
ciary Access to Digital Assets, ‘Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act’, February 15–16, 2013, s. 8
(3) (b) ‘(b) any provision in a terms-of-service agreement that limits a fiduciary’s access to the
18 digital assets of the account holder under this [act] is void as against the strong public
policy of 19 this state, unless the limitations of that provision are signed by the account
holder separately 20 from the other provisions of the terms-of-service agreement.’
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